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EXPEDITING EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS

Jerome I. ChapmanAmong the sterling accomplishments of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals under the leadership of Chief Judge Tuttle, one of the
finest has been the development of techniques for expediting effective
appellate relief in exigent circumstances. A survey of these imaginative and valuable techniques is, I believe, an appropriate part of the
Review's tribute to Judge Tuttle, who was instrumental in their development.
I
DELAYED AP.PELLATE REvIEw-A CASE IN POINT

In August 1948 Lyndon B. Johnson narrowly defeated Coke
Stevenson in the Texas Democratic primary for United States Senator.
Alleging irregularities in the vote count, Stevenson asked the federal
district court to enjoin Johnson's certification as the party's nominee.
On September 23, although the court's jurisdiction was dubious,' it
issued a preliminary injunction. Under Texas law Johnson's name
could not appear in the Democrats' column on the general election
ballot unless the injunction were lifted by September 30.
Johnson needed speedy relief, but he was unable to obtain it
from the Fifth Circuit, which was then in recess. On September 24,
Chief Judge Hutcheson heard arguments in chambers on Johnson's
motion to set aside the injunction pending appeal. Judge Hutcheson
ruled that, sitting alone, he was powerless to grant any relief other
than to set the case down for hearing on October 4, the next regularly
scheduled court day.2 Since relief on that date would have been meaningless, Johnson appealed to Justice Black of the United States Supreme Court. On September 29, after hearing lengthy arguments in
open court, Justice Black ordered the injunction stayed until further
order of the Supreme Court.3
j Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1960, Tulane University; LL.B.
1964, Harvard University. Law Clerk to Chief Judge Elbert P. Tuttle, 1964-65.
'I See Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108, 111 (5th Cir. 1948). Moreover, the injunction was ill-advised. It could have caused great injury to Johnson and needless expense
to the state, whereas denial would not have prejudiced Stevenson's ultimate right to relief.
2 Johnson v. Stevenson, No. 12,529, 5th Cir., Sept. 24, 1948 (order on motion for stay
of preliminary injunction).
3 See Johnson v. Stevenson, 335 U.S. 801 (1948).
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The rest is anticlimactic. Johnson was immediately certified as
the Democratic nominee. On October 4, the Fifth Circuit heard his
appeal and, three days later, held that the district court lacked juris4
diction.
The Johnson case-which illustrates the kind of urgent situation
in which the lower court effectively becomes the court of last resort
unless some form of expedited appellate review is available-raises a
number of interesting questions about the appellate process. Why was
a single circuit judge unable to grant the relief that a single Supreme
Court justice could grant? Why was a three-judge panel, or even a twojudge quorum, 5 unable to convene earlier? Was it really necessary for
the court of appeals to forfeit jurisdiction, as a practical matter, simply
because it was not scheduled to hear arguments until after meaningful
relief could have been granted?
These questions are now largely academic, at least in the Fifth
Circuit. Single circuit judges have not only stayed injunctions, 6 but
7
have also granted mandatory injunctions denied by the court below.
Moreover, since the spring of 1963, a pre-assigned panel has always
been available to rule on motions and emergency matters whenever
the Fifth Circuit is in recess. The court has heard appeals within a
few days, and sometimes even within a few hours, of the lower court's
ruling.8 In some instances, it has acted before the lower court has
made any ruling at all. 9 In these and other ways, discussed below, the
4 Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948).

5 In Tobin v. Ramey, 206 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1953), the losing party petitioned for
rehearing on the ground that only two judges had heard his appeal. In denying the
petition, the court held that two judges constitute a quorum.
6 See, e.g., Kelly v. Page, No. 20,720, 5th Cir., July 25, 1962 (Tuttle, C.J.), referred to
in Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114, 117 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964).
7 Woods v. Wright, 8 RACE RiEL. L. REP. 445 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.) (temporary
restraining order); Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (petition seeking an order "in the
nature of an injunction'); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., No. 19,928, 5th Cir., Aug. 8,
1962 (temporary restraining order), referred to in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372
U.S. 658, 662 nA (1963). See also Holmes v. Danner, 5 RAcE RFL. L. REP. 1069, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1961) (Tuttle, C.J.) (petition to vacate stay order granted); Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d
97, 101 n.1 (8th Cir. 1958) (injunction by two judges while court was in adjournment).
8 E.g., NAACP v. Thompson, 321 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1963) (15 days); Stell v. SavannahChatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963) (11 days); United States v.
Dallas County, 5th Cir., July 27, 1963 (about 5 hours), referred to in United States v.
Dallas County, 229 F. Supp. 1014, 1015 (S.D. Ala. 1964), and Armstrong v. Board of
Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 350-51 (5th Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion).
9 Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964) (mandamus); United States v. Lynd, 301
F.2d 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. (1962) (appeal, see p. 15 infra).
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court has mobilized itself to do equity on short notice, as the exigencies of the situation require.
II
TECHNIQUES FOR EXPEDITING APPELLATE RELIEF

A. Assuming Appellate Jurisdiction Early
In order to afford expeditious appellate relief in urgent situations, it has sometimes been necessary to make appellate review available at an early stage in the litigation. When the district court enters
a final judgment or an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction, invoking appellate jurisdiction raises no serious problems.
But the conventional doctrine is that issuance or denial of a temporary
restraining order is not appealable.' 0 Nevertheless, courts have properly
entertained appeals from such orders where failure to do so would, as a
practical matter, vitiate appellate review.
Sections 129111 and 1292(a)(1) 12 of the Judicial Code have both
been relied upon as statutory bases for allowing appeals from temporary restraining orders. In United States v. Wood,13 the Government
sought to enjoin an unlawful state prosecution of a civil rights worker,
alleging that the very act of prosecution would have a chilling effect

on a local voter-registration drive then entering a critical stage. Since
the district court's denial of the temporary restraining order determined "substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost
if review is delayed until final judgment,"' 14 the court of appeals found
the order sufficiently "final" to be reviewable under section 1291.15
10 See, e.g., Connell v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1957).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964) provides:
Final Decisions of District Court
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964) provides in part:
Interlocutory Decisions
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . or
of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court.
13 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
14 Id. at 778.

15 Similar tests have been applied in Wirtz v. Powell Knitting Mills Co., 360 F.2d
730, 732 (2d Cir. 1966), and Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1964); cf.
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In Dilworth v. Riner,16 also an action to enjoin an unlawful prosecution, appealability was predicated both on the concept of finality
expounded in Wood and on section 1292(a)(1). Emphasizing that the

court below had denied the temporary restraining order after an extensive hearing, the court held that the lower court's action was, in
substance, the denial of a preliminary injunction.
The Dilworth rationale for applying section 1292(a)(1) is too
broad. The fact that the trial judge holds a hearing before passing on
a motion for a temporary restraining order should not in itself render
his decision on the motion reviewable. It is proper to recognize, however, that in certain circumstances the decision on such a motion may
have the same practical impact as an order granting or denying a
preliminary injunction." The pragmatic test of finality under section
1291, on the other hand, seems eminently sound. Based on the traditional principle that substance governs, rather than form, the Wood
approach recognizes that the reasons for the nonappealability of temporary restraining orders often do not apply in exigent situations, in
which court orders, even though of limited duration, may be dispositive of substantial rights. Review plainly should be allowed, even with
respect to technically "non-final" orders, "[w]here the effect of a district
court's order, if not reviewed, is the death knell of the action . ...",u
The logical, if conceptually awkward, extension of the pragmatic
test occurred in United States v. Lynd.19 At the close of a fairly extensive hearing in the district court, the Government moved for a
preliminary injunction against continued racial discriminaton in
voter registration on the part of a Mississippi County Registrar and
others. Fourteen days later, the district court having failed to rule on
the motion, the Government appealed. 20 Noting the lengthy delays
previously permitted by the trial court, the court of appeals held that
"[t]he movant, under such circumstances, was clearly entitled to have
a ruling from the trial judge, and since he did not grant the order
his action in declining to do so was in all respects a 'refusal,'" appealable under section 1292(a)(1).21
Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1967); Empire Nat. Bank v. Penfield Coal
& Coke Co., 354 F.2d 873 (3d Cir. 1966).
16 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965).
65.07 (2d ed. 1966).
17 See 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
18 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966); accord, Wirtz v.
Powell Knitting Mills Co., 360 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1966).
19 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1962).
20 Record at 1216.
21 301 F.2d at 822.
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In Davis v. Board of School Commissioners,22 the district court
had also failed to rule on a motion for a preliminary injunction
against a segregated school system. 23 The court of appeals refused to

allow an appeal in this case, however, apparently because there was
no evidence that the trial court had been improperly dilatory. But the
opinion admonished the district court that it had a "duty... to promptly rule on this motion" and that "this court must require prompt and
reasonable starts, even displacing the District Court discretion, where
local control is not desired, or is abdicated by failure to promptly act." 24
The principle lesson of Lynd and Davis is a sound one: a district
court's inaction may be tantamount to a "denial" of a preliminary
injunction. But the criteria for applying this lesson in other cases have
not been clearly delineated. In NAACP v. Thompson,25 the court
proffered the following general formulation:
This question must be tested in the same way as other discretionary acts of the trial court. If the posture of the case is such
that the plaintiff's rights have been so clearly established that a
failure of the trial court to grant the injunctive relief would be
set aside by an appellate court as an abuse of discretion, then for
the trial court to fail to enter an order either granting or denying
the relief sought may be considered [an appealable action] .... 26
Although the certainty of a reversal and inordinate trial delay are
both relevant, neither is sufficient to justify allowing an appeal 27 prior
to any decision in the lower court. The critical question should be
how urgently a ruling is needed in the particular circumstances. Where
time is of the essence, the failure to rule on a motion for preliminary
injunction may properly be viewed as a denial of the motion.
B. Granting Mandatory Injunctions Pending Appeal
Stays of lower court rulings by an appellate court are quite common and well accepted. Occasionally, however, the situation calls for
affirmative appellate relief, in the nature of a "mandatory interlocutory
injunction." Lawyers seem to have a phobia with regard to this form
22 318 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
23 Instead of ruling on the motion, the trial court entered an order continuing the
case pending a 30-day period for the submission of briefs. The appeal was noted 13 days
later. Record at 41.
24 318 F.2d at 64.
25 321 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.).
26 Id. at 202.
27 It should be noted that review of trial court inaction might also be obtained by
mandamus. See Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964).
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of relief,28 but the Fifth Circuit's recent experience reveals that the
device is often not the bogy some have thought it to be.
A typical example of a mandatory interlocutory injunction may
in Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education.2
found
be
On May 13, 1963-nearly nine years after the Supreme Court held
that states may not maintain racially segregated public schools 3 0 -the
district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction ordering a
Georgia school board to begin, desegregation. The basis of the court's
decision was that it was better for all concerned to leave the schools
segregated.31 On May 24, 1963, the court of appeals issued an injunction pending appeal. The court ordered the district court to require
the school board immediately to draw up a plan for desegregating at
least one grade per year, beginning with the 1963-64 school year. The
order was to "remain in effect until the final determination of the
appeal ...

on the merits," and, during its pendency, the trial court

was directed "to enter such other and further orders as may be appro32
priate or necessary in carrying out the expressed terms of this order."
The critical issue for an appellate court asked to accord relief
such as that granted in Stell is one of discretion, not of power. The
courts of appeals have the power to grant "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law." 33 It is perhaps debatable whether an
injunction not aimed simply at maintaining the status quo is in aid of
"jurisdiction" or agreeable to "principles of law." But there should be
no substantial doubt that a court of appeals, which can order mandatory injunctive relief after a leisurely briefing schedule and the usual
delays resulting from calendar congestion, has the power to do the
same thing provisionally at an earlier stage in the appeal.
A number of criteria for the exercise of this power can be derived
from the recent Fifth Circuit cases. To a large extent, the criteria
parallel those applicable to a motion for preliminary relief in the lower
courts. Thus, where the right to provisional relief is clearly established
by prior decisions, the court of appeals may properly accord such relief
itself when the lower court fails in its duty to do so. In school desegrega28 None of the cases indexed under "mandatory preliminary injunctions"

in

MODERN FEDERAL PRArTicE DIEST, Injunction § 133 (1960), has a kind word for this class of

injunctions.
29 318 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1963).
30 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31 See 318 F.2d at 427.
32 Id. at 428.
33 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
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tion cases, for example, the court of appeals correctly awarded interlocutory relief on a number of occasions when recalcitrant district judges
repeatedly ignored the Supreme Court's mandate that school boards had
to make "a prompt and reasonable start" toward desegregation.34 In
the more typical case, however, where the lower court's decision cannot
be treated as a blatant departure from settled authority, the criteria for
appellate interlocutory injunctions are somewhat more complicated.
The strength of the appellant's case on the merits, as it appears
from the briefs and pleadings, has been considered important in several cases. In Greene v. Fair,35 for example, the court denied an injunction pending appeal because the appellant had not demonstrated "that
there is great likelihood, approaching near certainty, that he will
prevail when his case finally comes to be heard on the merits . .

.,,6

On the other hand, an injunction pending appeal was granted in
Harrisv. Gibson37 because of the "strong probability" that the appellants would ultimately prevail, and because they would be "irreparably" injured if the injunction were denied. And in United States v.
Lynd,38 the injunction was based on the appellant's "clear showing
that rights which it sought to vindicate were being violated," and that,
absent provisional relief, these violations would persist "for some considerable period."39
It is quite proper, in the ordinary case, that preliminary relief
should be denied unless the court is persuaded by a relatively quick
examination of the papers before it that the case has exceptional
merit. Although cases involving injunctions are generally given calendar preference over other appeals, a litigant should not be accorded
special priority merely because he filed a motion for temporary relief.
The court should not be expected to give the same sort of consideration to a motion for temporary relief as it would give on plenary
review. 40 Otherwise all appellants, except those desiring delay, would
seek temporary relief.
34 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). For cases awarding interlocutory relief, see, e.g., Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963); Davis
v. Board of School Comm'rs, 322 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1963).
35 314 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam). See also Eastern Greyhound Lines v.
Fusco, 310 F.2d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 1962); NAACP v. Thompson, 321 F.2d 199, 202-03
(5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.) (dictum).
36 314 F.2d at 202.
37 322 F.2d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Woods v. Wright, 8 RACE REL. L. REP.
445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.).
38 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.) (Tuttle, C.J.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1962).
39 Id. at 823.
40 This is not -to say that the court is unable to do so. Many cases are decided in a
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Even if the appellant can quickly demonstrate a strong case, however, the mere likelihood that a case will be reversed after plenary
consideration should not be sufficient for the court of appeals to exercise its injunctive power. The appropriate division of labor between
trial and appellate courts rests primary responsibility for questions of
provisional relief with the former, partly because the trial court is in
a superior position to ascertain the facts. Appellate courts should be
most reluctant to issue interlocutory injunctions where disputed
factual issues are critical to the decision.41 Even where no facts are in
dispute, precipitous appellate intervention at the early stages of litigation might complicate the lawsuit and actually result in a loss of time.
Moreover, since there are serious problems in enforcing appellate
court injunctions, 42 the power should be used with some restraint. An
interlocutory appellate injunction should usually be granted only when
the issues involved are of great moment or when severe and irreparable
harm will otherwise result.
An exception to the requirement that the appellant must demonstrate that he will probably prevail on the merits is made where
injunctive relief is essential to keep a case alive for later appellate
review. In Jiminez v. Barker,43 for example, the Ninth Circuit, in an
ex parte proceeding, temporarily enjoined the appellee from deporting
the appellant. Had he been deported, the case would have become moot
before the court could give it further consideration. Nine days later, the
court dismissed the appeal sua sponte as frivolous.44 Interlocutory
injunctive relief seems appropriate in such circumstances. The court's
interest in preserving its own jurisdiction is strong enough to override
any formalistic objections to "mandatory interlocutory injunctions,"
fairly short time. Although briefs and oral arguments prepared in a hurry may not be
of the highest quality, they are likely to be at least as good as the general run of briefs
and arguments with which the court regularly deals.
41 In some situations, the courts of appeals may be called on to resolve factual
disputes in the course of granting provisional relief. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384
U.S. 597 (1966); Note, Preliminary Injunctions for the FTC in Merger Cases, 52 Coxm=.
L.Q. 461, 468 (1967).
42 The Fifth Circuit has sought to minimize enforcement problems by directing the
district court to enter injunctions instead of granting them itself. On occasion, however,
the court has found itself sitting to hear evidence in an action for contempt of its
orders. See, e.g., United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1965). Though problems
involved in dealing with contempt of an appellate court are beyond the scope of this
article, it should be noted that such contempts are not uncommon, particularly with
respect to appellate court enforcement of administrative orders.
43
44

252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1958).
Another illustrative case is Public Util. Comm'n v. Capitol Transit Co., 214 F.2d

242 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[V7ol. 53:12

and it should make no difference whether or not the appellant can
demonstrate the probability of reversal. Of course, even here the merits
of the case are relevant, and if it is manifestly clear thdt the appellant
will not prevail, obviously no relief should be accorded.
C. Expediting Implementation of the Appellate Decision
Ordinarily, there is some delay before a judgment of the court
of appeals takes effect. In the Fifth Circuit, the court's mandate usually
issues twenty-one days after judgment, and is stayed automatically
upon the timely filing of a petition for rehearing. 45 At times, however,
the circumstances demand immediate effectiveness of the court's order.
In Kennedy v. Bruce,46 for example, the district court had denied
the Government's request for the production of voting records to
which it was indisputably entitled. Reversing the decision, the Fifth
Circuit ordered that its mandate issue forthwith "[b]ecause of long
delay that has already occurred since the filing of the application that
should have been granted as a matter of course .... "47 In other cases,
mandates have issued forthwith to enjoin a continuing deprivation
of constitutional rights48 or because of the imminence of some critical

event-such as the start of a new school term or the close of a voterregistration period.4 9
Prior to May 31, 1963, the Fifth Circuit's Rules did not provide
for expediting the issuance of the mandate. On that date, the Rules
were amended to provide that the mandate would issue within the
prescribed time "unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order."' 0
At present, the rules of four circuits still provide for delayed mandates
and mandatory stays upon the filing of petitions for rehearing. 51 The
rules should be amended explicitly to permit the court to effectuate
its rulings forthwith where it is advisable to do so. Even in the absence
of such an amendment, however, the issuance of immediate mandates
probably can be accomplished in exigent cases on the basis of general
equity powers.
After an appellate court's mandate issues in an equity suit, there
still may be important, and time-consuming, unfinished business-the
framing of the decree. Customarily, this is the task of the district court.
45 5TH Cm. R. 32.

46 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962) (Tuttle, C.J.).
47 Id. at 864.
48 Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 658 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.).
49 Harris v. Gibson, 322 F.2d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 1963) (school); United States v. Lynd,
301 F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1962) (voter registration).
50 5TH CiR. R. 32. For an early example of the use of the rule, see Kennedy v.

Owen, 321 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1963).
53 D.C. Cm. R. 25(c)-(d); 6TnsCm. R. 24; 9TH Cm. R. 26; 10TH Cm. R. 28.
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In a distressing number of civil rights cases, however, southern district
judges have failed to carry out the Fifth Circuit's rulings. 52 As a result,
the court of appeals has been compelled to formulate its own decrees
and order their entry, sometimes verbatim, by the district courts.
53
Appellate courts clearly have the power to formulate decrees.
Indeed, in the early days of American law, the power was exercised
regularly. 54 Nevertheless, the practice is not usually favored today.
Even while framing desegregation and voting rights decrees with relative frequency, the Fifth Circuit has noted that "it is clearly more
desirable for injunctive relief to be granted at the level of the trial
court rather than by an appellate court if the same necessary results
can be accomplished." 55
There are several reasons for preferring to leave the drafting of
decrees to the district court. First, the trial judge will often be in a
superior position to obtain knowledge of the facts on which the order
must be based. Second, it is ordinarily a more efficient division of
labor to relegate the details of the decree to the trial judge. Finally,
since there is usually more than one proper way to frame the decree,
comity and humility suggest deference to the judge below.
But the first reason is sometimes inapplicable, and the others are
not always persuasive. Since the decree entered in many cases is drafted
by the winning counsel, or jointly by both counsel, decree-framing is
often merely a matter of passing on the suitability of the lawyers'
handiwork. The appellate courts are probably as adept at such a task
as the lower courts. This is not to say that appellate decree-framing
should become common. But if factual issues need not be resolved,
the traditional aversion to appellate decree-framing should not be
difficult to overcome where the pressures of time or the need for uniformity5 6 makes it advisable for the appellate court to frame the relief
itself.
III
EMERGENCY APPELLATE REvIEw

DURING RECESS

Because the judges of most circuit courts are drawn from several
states, it is often difficult to convene a panel on short notice when
52 For a discussion of the cases and suggested solutions, see Comment, Judicial
Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE L.J. 90 (1963).
53 See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425, 427-28 (5th
Cir. 1963).
54 R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIvIL CAsES 306 (1941).
55 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 318 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir.
1963) (Tuttle, C.J.).
56 See Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 245, 261 (1966). See also
Wisdom, Chief Judge Tuttle and the Fifth Circuit, 53 CORNELL L. Rv. 6, 10-11 (1967).
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the court is in recess. But emergencies are as likely to arise during
recess as when the court is in session, and techniques for expediting
appellate relief in urgent situations are of little value if no tribunal
is available which can utilize them.
One solution to this problem is to allow a single circuit judge to
act on interlocutory motions. In Woods v. Wright,57 for example, the
superintendent of the Birmingham school system had ordered the
suspension, a few days before the end of the school term, of a large
number of Negro students who had participated in civil rights demonstrations. The demonstrations were not during school time, and there
was no indication that any of the students were truants. On May 22,
1963, the district court refused a temporary restraining order against
the suspensions, even though they would have resulted in the students'
losing credit for the entire school year. At seven o'clock that evening,
Judge Tuttle heard arguments in open court. Shortly thereafter he
granted the appellants' motion for a temporary injunction, ordering
the superintendent to rescind his suspension edict and to do all in his
power immediately to notify the suspended students that they could
return to school. In view of the strength of the appellants' case and
the exigencies of their situation, s the judge ruled that it was his "duty
to maintain the status quo of these individual students to the end that
their education is not illegally interfered with until the case can be
argued and decided in the Court of Appeals." 59
The authorities usually cited to sustain action such as that in
Woods are the All Writs Act 6° and Rule 62(g) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."' Reliance on the rule is misplaced. Although it
recognizes that the power to grant temporary injunctions may reside in a single circuit judge, it does not itself confer the power.
Reliance on the All Writs Act, on the other hand, seems sound. Such
reliance has been attacked on the ground that the statute deals only
with the authority of a "court," and not with that of a "judge,"6 2 but
this distinction is not persuasive. While the court of appeals tradi57 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 445 (5th Cir. 1963).
58 When the case was ultimately decided on the merits, the court strongly criticized
the lower court's failure to grant relief as a violation of its "duty" to protect the movants
against the "clear and imminent threat of an irreparable injury amounting to manifest
oppression ....
" Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 1964) (Jones, J.).
59 Woods v. Wright, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964), quoted at p. 17 supra.
61 See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Woods v. Wright, 8
RACE RFL. L. REP. 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963) (Tuttle, C.J.).
62 Note, The All Writs Statute and the Injunctive Power of a Single Appellate
Judge, 64 MICH. L. REy. 324, 328 (1965).
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tionally sits in three-judge panels, the Judicial Code plainly recognizes
the validity of action by a "court" of fewer than three judges. 63 In
addition, although the concep of inherent judicial power has not been
carefully developed, it is at least arguable that there are basic attributes of the judicial office which sustain a single appellate judge's
power to afford interlocutory relief in exigent situations.
Whatever a single judge's basic powers, the court of appeals has
the power to grant affirmative interlocutory relief, and it should be
able to delegate its power to one of its members where justice requires.
The Rules of the Supreme Court expressly provide that "writs of
injunction may be granted by any justice in cases where they might
be granted by the court. ' 64 Most circuits also have rules with respect
to interlocutory relief by a single judge which, while not as explicit
as the Supreme Court's rule, may imply a delegation of the necessary
authority to protect the parties and the court's jurisdiction in appropriate cases. 65 The rules generally contemplate that the single-judge
action which they authorize will not substantially affect the disposition
of the appeal on the merits. But this limitation should not preclude a
judge from issuing mandatory orders that are necessary to preserve
appellate jurisdiction. In such cases the failure to grant relief would
have an even more substantial effect on the ultimate disposition of the
appeal.
Approving an injunction issued by two of its judges, the court
in Aaron v. Cooper6 6 stated the arguments against permitting a single
judge to render other than routine interlocutory relief.
The object of the practice [of having at least two judges rule
on interlocutory injunctions] is to prevent any attempt at "shopping" as to such applications; to make the soundness of the action
on such applications more certain; and to avoid the public unseemliness of a single circuit judge setting up his judgment against
that of another individual judge (district judge). 67
These arguments are not dispositive. The notion that it is "unseemly"
for a single circuit judge to grant interlocutory injunctions in urgent
cases is not persuasive. Single Supreme Court justices often have
63 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1964) provides that "cases and controversies shall be heard and
determined by a court or division of not more than three judges ...." (Emphasis added.)
See also 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1964) (quorum).
64 Sup. CT. R. 51(l).
65 Authorizing orders "preparatory to hearing": lsr Cu. R. 4(2); 2D Cm R. 4(b);
5TH Cm. R. 4(2); 6TH Cm. R. 3(3); 7TH CR. R. 4(b); 8TH Cm. R. 4(c); 9TH Cut. R. 5(2);
10H Cm. R. 4(2) (Chief or Senior Judge only). See also isT CiR. R. 26(5); 3D Cut. R. 30(3);
4TH Cm. R. 33; 10TH Cm. R. 22(3).
66 261 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1958).
67 Id. at 101 n.1.
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granted temporary relief denied by a three-judge court of appeals or
an even larger state supreme court. 68 Nor does it necessarily follow
that additional judges make the soundnSss of a decision more certain.
In any event, where only one judge is available in time to afford effective relief, the question whether an extra hand will contribute substantially is academic. Finally, although judge-shopping may be a
serious evil in some circumstances, fear of this practice should not require an absolute prohibition on single-judge injunctions. Less drastic,
but sufficiently effective, defenses against judge-shopping may be
established.6
The soundest solution to the problem of granting effective emergency relief during recess in a geographically dispersed circuit is
that adopted by the Fifth Circuit in the spring of 1963. For each week
that the court is in recess, an interim panel is pre-assigned to handle
both routine motions and emergency matters. Most of the work, typically amounting to ten to twenty applications per week, has been of
a routine nature. This work must be performed in any event, and the
assignment of these jobs to rotating panels makes for a fair allocation
of the work load. More important, the regular assignment of interim
panels means that when emergencies arise a three-judge body is ready
70
for action.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing has been a survey and analysis of the techniques
that the Fifth Circuit has utilized within this decade for quickening
the pace of appellate practice in exigent circumstances. Although these
techniques were developed for the most part in response to the South's
massive resistance to the civil rights movement, 71 they need not be
limited to that region or that era. Even for the most conservative
jurists, these techniques are, in the words of Cardozo, "a doctrine for
68 See Note, The Powers of the Supreme Court Justice Acting in an Individual
Capacity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 981, 1000-13 (1964).
69 The 8th Circuit's two-judge rule (see Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97, 101 n.1 (8th
Cir. 1958)) does not prevent the judge for whom the moving party has shopped from
shopping himself for a like-minded colleague. A better approach would be to assign to
a specific judge or judges the task of considering emergency motions during each recess
and to keep the assignments secret.
70 When a hearing is called for and the assigned panel members cannot conveniently
meet, the practice has been either to permit one or two of the members to conduct the
hearing and report to the absent members or to "vouch in" other available judges to
form a panel. In extreme cases requiring oral presentation, modern devices such as the
long-distance conference telephone call might also be called into play.
71 See Tuttle, Equality and the Vote, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 245, 257 (1966).
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emergencies-a weapon of peaceful revolution to be kept under lock
and key, and employed with circumspection in hours of stress and
strain .... -72 For those who prefer Llewellyn's philosophy, they are
part of "the daily leeways [which] are there not for neglect but for
use." 73 In either view, they constitute an important development in
our equity jurisprudence.
72 Address by Hon. Benjamin N. Cardozo, 55 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REP. 263, 272
(1932).
73 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITON: DECING APPEALs 220 (1960).

